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Abstract:  This paper continues a research born in 1993 as a consequence of the growing concern regarding 
the escalation of violence in Colombia; its objective is to create an econometric model capable of 
forecasting the path of terrorist murder under different policy options and helping the country in the design 
of state policy drawing the lineaments for reaching the pacification of the country. I claim that the approach 
presented here is the only way of creating an econometric model for terrorist murder in Colombia. In the 
first part I use The Beveridge and Nelson decomposition of economic time series to estimate the cyclical 
component of murder, which is used later to construct a theoretically and statistically satisfying model to 
account for cyclically motivated terrorist murder in Colombia, 1950-2004. The variables that together 
account for eighty three percent of the variation in cyclical terrorist murder are the years of Colombias La 
Violencia period when the peasant self-defense movements appeared, the years of the so-called National 
Front political collusion between the two main establishment parties, the real trade balance, the size of 
Colombias military forces as a proxy for all armed forces (military, para-military, guerrilla, and drug-
related) in the country, the unemployment rate, the number of students matriculated in all modalities and 
people displaced in the country.  The forecasts for cyclical terrorist murder for 2003-2004 show the big 
dilemma facing the Colombian authorities: the strong reduction of displaced people from 212,000 in 2003 
to 117,000 in 2004 boosted the cyclical terrorist murder in the countryside, erasing the initial results by 
president Uribes administration at controlling the intensity of the conflict and implying that any future 
policy at diminishing it should control the number of displaced people, one of the biggest problems facing 
Colombia today.  The final section presents forecasts for 2005-2019 suggesting, that peace will be attained 
around year 2008 and, that the way, at this point to reach sustainable peace is through the continuation of 
the Democratic Security Policy and strong presidential leadership headed towards disarmament of all 
armed actors in the country combined with the implementing of political and social changes that will secure 
lasting peace before year 2019.  
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A Model of Cyclical Terrorist Murder in Colombia, 1950-2005.  
Forecasts 2005-2019. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Latin American countries record, by far, the highest homicide rates in the world, 
averaging 20 to 30 murders per 100,000 people, i.e., two to three times as many as in the 
next most violent regions of the world (see, e.g., Guerrero, 1998; and, especially, 
Londoño, 1998, p. 72).   Within Latin America, Colombia is known for its extremely high 
levels of homicidal violence, resulting in one of the highest murder rates in the world.  
According to Colombian National Police statistics, homicides increased from around 
5,000 per year in the 1950s and 1960s to about 10,000 per year by 1980 and 30,000 per 
year in the early 1990s. 
During the last years however, this tendency has changed. Now murder declines from 
28,781 in 2002 (around 66 murders per 100,000 people) to 22,973 in 2003 (52 murders 
per capita), and 20,133 in 2004 (44.4 per capita  figure 1). A further reduction emerges 
when analyzing cyclical terrorist murder per capita figures1 of 4.06, -6.8 and 14.42 for 
those years respectively (figure 1A) suggesting both that terrorist murder is being 
eradicated and that Colombias civil conflict is dying.  I claim that after 14 years of 
research I have found a way to construct a theoretically and statistically good model for 
cyclical terrorist murder than can be applied to other countries infected by terrorism. 
  The research reported here do not use the original per capita series of murder in 
Colombia since there is no way to construct such a model, so I take advantage of the fact 
                                                        
1 The estimation of the cyclical terrorist murder per 100,000 people is presented in the section for data and 
methods. 
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that the per capita murder series have a unit root and split it in its cyclical (terrorist 
murder) and permanent components3. 
 
Figure 1
Homicides in Colombia 1946-2004
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Figure 1A Cyclical terrorist murder and permanent 
murder in Colombia 1946-2004
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Colombias murderous violence is related to three salient features: political violence, 
guerrilla activity and drug trade, while the first two have marred the country for decades, 
the latter one appeared in the seventies.  But less well known and appreciated is that these 
two factors account only for a small portion of all murders in the country (Guerrero, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 There are no negative murders.  Negative murders in this case represent homicides falling below the trend 
line as a consequence of an agonizing civil conflict. 
3 In general terms the original series of per capita murder per 100,000 is identical to the new cyclical 
terrorist murder per capita estimated according to Beveridge and Nelson, a inspection of figures 1 and 1A 
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1998, p.98).  For murder, the primary risk factors are alcohol consumption, possession of 
firearms, and weekends.  For example, a quarter of all murders take place on Sundays, 
more than half on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays, with disproportionate increases on 
holidays.  Most murders are non-political, take place at night, in urban areas, are 
committed by poor people on poor people, and alcohol is frequently found in the victims 
(Londoño, 1998, especially p.75; Guerrero 1998), although Guerrero observes that while 
alcohol consumption might explain the high levels it cannot explain the drastic increase 
in violence in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s (1998, p.98).  Others, such as 
Uprimny(2001, p.47), through the comparison between Colombia and Bolivia conclude 
the lack of collective action as an explanation of the persistence of violence in Colombia. 
 
Also contrary to popular perception, several studies have failed to establish links between 
murderous violence and poverty rates, unemployment rates, urbanization rates, or rates of 
economic growth (Londoño, 1998, p.74; Guerrero, 1998, p. 97).  Indeed, Rubio (1997) 
and others have made persuasive arguments according to which the educated and 
uneducated classes both engage in criminal and violent activity for the simple reason that 
crime pays well.  Income and education are no longer linked, but income and crime are 
(Rubio 1997, p.812). Average annual income from crimes have been variously estimated 
up to $70,000 per person, a huge premium over Colombias per capita 1995 GDP of 
around $1,800 (Bejarano, 1997, p.12).  The break-down of the Colombian justice system 
further encourages criminal and violent behavior, as the probability of being caught, 
tried, and convicted is becoming smaller over time.  By 1994, conviction rates had 
                                                                                                                                                                     
confirms so; basically the main difference is that the cyclical component enlarges the cycles and peaks 
allowing the construction an estimation of a theoretically satisfying model for cyclical terrorist murder. 
Gómez-Sorzano: A Model of Cyclical Terrorist Murder in Colombia 1950-2004.  Forecasts 2005- 2019       
                                                                                                                                                                
 
5
dropped to below four percent (Rubio, 1998a,p.606), and sentences rarely exceeded six 
months of jail time (Rubio, 1998b, p.91). In a recent paper (Levitt and Rubio, 2000) find 
as explanations for Colombias high crime rate: the drug trade, lack of punishment of 
criminals, guerrillas, poverty and income inequality and a probable propensity to violence 
from Colombians. 
There is wide-spread agreement among analysts of all stripes that Colombias violence is 
costly, both at the microeconomic level (e.g., Dinar and Keck, 1997) and at the 
macroeconomic level estimated at up to 15 percent of GDP (Bejarano, 1997, p.10) and 
there is some evidence that major perpetrators of violence  the military and paramilitary 
forces, the drug traders, and the various guerrilla groups  might be acting in a semi-
collusive fashion to keep the spoils of war going (Richani, 1997), evidence almost 
perfectly in line with the theory suggested by Brito and Intriligator (1992). Brauer, 
Gómez-Sorzano, and Sethuraman (2004A) have applied the Hodrick-Prescott and 
Beveridge-Nelson business-cycle decomposition methods to separate the Colombian 
homicide time-series into a permanent and a cyclical component.  They interpret the latter 
as due to political violence, economic booms and guerrilla activity and, when matching 
their estimated cyclical terrorist murder series with the political and economic events as 
well as terrorist activity in the country, they appear to generate a good overlap between 
the political and guerrilla violence the history suggests and the economic booms at least 
for the time period 1946-2004. In the next section I re-estimate the cyclical component 
for 1946-2004 and start the construction of a model that would capture the causal reasons 
why cyclical terrorist murder would move in the way it does.   
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Data and methods 
 
Data were collected in Colombia from various Colombia sources and adjusted for 
inflation and population growth (see data source appendix for a detailed description).  
The estimation method used is linear multiple regression.  
 
 
Decomposition of Colombian murder into permanent and transitory components4 
 
 
I use The Beveridge and Nelson (BN for short) decomposition of economic time series to 
obtain the cyclical and permanent components of murder.  This method has been applied 
in Colombia to decompose macro indicators as gross domestic product (GDP) by authors 
as Cárdenas (1991).  It is applied in this paper for social variables, related with crimes, 
specifically Colombian homicides recorded annually from 1946 to 20045.  The purpose of 
this decomposition is twofold, to construct a model explaining cyclical terrorist murder 
and in a future research a model for permanent murder. 
 
According to BN (1981) after verifying that the series of the logarithm of murder 1946-
2004 do not reject the existence of a unit root, I proceed to perform the decomposition, 
which begins by adjusting the per capita murder series (PCM) to an ARIMA model with 
k autoregressive and h moving average components as follows: 
 
                                                        
4 The technical reason for decomposing murder to create and estimate a model for cyclical terrorist murder 
stems in the fact that the series has a unit root; additionally I realized multiples attempts to model the 
original per capita series for murder using the independent theoretical variables shown ahead, it was not 
possible to come across with a theoretically attractive model keeping reasonable econometric fitting. 
  
5 The Colombian National Police distinguish 15 comprehensive categories of crime.  Category #13, called 
crimes against life and personal integrity includes:  abortion, common body lesions, culpable lesions 
(lesions in job related accidents), culpable homicide (job related homicides), homicide, aggravated 
homicide (assassination), death associated with the exercise of official police duties and since 1993 murder 
with terrorist intent.  For this analysis I use the last for subcategories collapsed in a single series. 
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The model estimated for the Colombian case includes moving average components of 
order 1, 5 and 13, (t statistics shown in parenthesis): 
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After replacing its parameters an adding the estimated residuals from the last regression, 
the permanent component of murder is calculated according to equation [3]:  
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Finally the transitory component is found by means of the difference between the original 
series and the permanent per capita component ( PCtM ) and is shown in figure 1A. It 
coincides with the political events experienced by the country since 1946 and narrated by 
Colombian historians. I use the chronology and political description of events taken from 
Bushnell (1993) and Valencia (1997), finding that the re-estimated cyclical component 
1946-2004 coincides with them. 
 
 
Historical adjustment of the estimated cyclical component of murder with major 
socio political events in Colombia. 
 
The Liberal party was in power for 16 consecutive years from 1930 to 1946, and this 
period was called the Liberal Republic.  Although the country historically has had one of 
the longest electoral traditions in the continent and the world (Uribe Vélez, 2005, p. 16)6 
                                                        
6 This paper is a presidential address to the Colombians in regards to the social and economic 
improvements that the country must reach by year 2019. 
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and in spite that at that time the Colombian two party system, was superficially taken as 
evidence of the countrys political stability, it was a handy way of keeping alive old 
grudges and passing them from father to son to grandson.  This caused a rising cycle of 
violence just in time for the presidential elections of 1946 (figure 1A), this year begins a 
struggle for bureaucratic positions, the winners in elections wish to dominate all the 
positions, while the losers fight hard not to lose them; in the middle of this cycle in 1948 
Gaitán, a charismatic liberal leader is assassinated starting what was called The 
Bogotazo, defined as an outburst of mass rioting in Bogotá and all over the country. 
Gaitán was disliked by most of the party establishment. His assassination caused that the 
army became tainted by politics and so, in a battle in 1952 at the peak of the cyclical 
component (figure 1A) they left an estimated of 1,500 people dead in El Líbano, State of 
Tolima. 
In 1953 the country had a second military government.  General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
becomes president (the cyclical component shows a decrease in the pace of murder). 
During his regime thousands of guerrillas surrendered their weapons from 1953 to 1954 and 
that led to a declining cycle7. Then from 1958 to 1974 the country had the system of 
presidential alternation in power called the National Front, this was a new era of political 
reconciliation and domestic peace the instutionalization of a bipartisan rule put an end to 
the electoral competition (decreasing cycle, figure 1A).  It is in this period, (specifically 
years 1963-1965-1967 and 1970) that guerrilla groups appeared: in 1963 the 
Revolutionary armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is born, in 1965 the National Liberation 
                                                        
7 The time period 1947-60 is generally referred to as La Violencia, defined as a period of intense power clashes 
between the Liberal and Conservative parties mingled with a Rojas military intervention 1953-57.  A 
paradoxical phenomenon of these years was a surge of economic growth, homicides were going up but so was 
Gómez-Sorzano: A Model of Cyclical Terrorist Murder in Colombia 1950-2004.  Forecasts 2005- 2019       
                                                                                                                                                                
 
9
Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in 1967 and, the M-19 Group in 1970. 
The M-19 Groups life was ephemeral.  In 1979 they stole 5,000 weapons from an army 
canton in the north of Bogotá. Later in 1980 they used them for taking over the 
Dominican Republics embassy in Bogotá in the midst of a diplomatic reception and 
holding hostage 14 ambassadors including the U.S envoy. 
 
From 1982 to 1986 the country experienced a first peace process. There were intensive 
efforts by the government to reach cease fire agreements with guerrilla groups, except for 
the ELN, resulting in a decreasing cycle as shown in Figure 1A. However, in these 
agreements substantial items were not clearly resolved, particularly regarding 
demobilization and surrendering of weapons.  The agreements generated positive 
advantages for the groups, by paralyzing military operations and leaving large empty 
geographical gaps that were occupied by new guerrilla cells. 
In 1984 the Justice Minister increased pressure on the drug industry causing the destruction  
of the largest clandestine laboratory but was later assassinated  by the Medellín Cartel. Later 
in 1985 and, during peace talks the M-19 Group seized the Justice Palace, seat of the 
Supreme Court,  holding as hostage magistrates that by the end of the night were 
assassinated8.  The assault to the Justice Palace was the final blow to the frustrated peace 
process and so, from 1986 to 1991 cyclical murder takes the form of a general conflict, 
made up of the confrontation between the government, drug traffickers and guerrillas, which 
caused hundreds of deaths in the Communist Party  (Unión Patriótica), and the assassination 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the GDP, at a rate of  five percent annually between 1945-1955. Industrial output  showed even sharper  growth 
at a yearly rate of nine percent. 
8 There was intensive fire between the groups and the military who used tanks to get into the Palace. At the end 
of the nigth The Palace was completely destroyed and burned out.  
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of the Attorney General and three presidential candidates (Bernardo Jaramillo, Luis Carlos 
Galán and Carlos Pizarro).   
In 1990, Liberal César Gaviria is elected president starting a process of constitutional 
reform. He changed the Constitution and the policy toward drugs traffickers, he rejected 
extradition as a mean of countering the drug traffic and unveiled a program for dealing 
with the drug problem that produced concrete results: any trafficker that voluntarily 
surrender to Colombian authorities and plead guilty to one or more charges would not be 
extradited to the U.S. but instead tried in Colombia.  The Medellín Cartel organization 
declared a truce, and Pablo Escobar gave himself up in 1992, figure 1A captures this 
declining cycle. 
In 1993, as the U.S. press for his extradition Escobar, escaped prison launching another 
terrorist campaign, but was killed by Los Pepes a group belonging to the Cali Cartel.  In 
1994, Liberal Ernesto Samper is elected president and Colombia is decertified by 
Washington for the alleged involvement of drug money in the electoral campaign. A new 
actor in the conflict appeared this year, a federation of paramilitary groups led by Carlos 
Castaño and called Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC).  As a consequence of this, 
murder and displacement of civilians in the countryside increases sharply. 
In 1998, Conservative Andrés Pastrana is elected president starting a second Peace 
Process and an ambitious plan to establish a negotiated peace without a cease fire 
agreement. Pastranas government gave a demilitarized zone (DMZ) the size of 
Switzerland to the FARC and restricted the presence of the army and the police within 
such zones.  Cyclical murder is on the rise (figure 1A).  
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In 2002, independent Liberal Alvaro Uribe is elected president, enacting a strong policy 
to confront guerrillas and paramilitary, his Democratic Security Policy proves effective at 
diminishing the intensity of the conflict; the country lowers total and transitory murder 
per capita.   
As the estimated component coincides with the historical political narrative I have called 
it Cyclical Terrorist Murder and begin the construction of a model explaining the causal 
reasons for its movement across time. 
 
Initial model 
Political variables 
Cyclical terrorist murder might be thought of as a combined mixture of politically 
motivated violence and guerrilla activity.  In Colombia, the time-period from 1946 to 
1957 (or in Bushnells, 1993, discussion from 1947 to 1960) is generally referred to as La 
Violencia, a period of intense power clashes between the liberal and conservative 
parties, mingled with a brief, over military intervention (1954-1958) and incipient 
guerrilla activity.  But from 1958 to 1978, the two main establishment parties came to a 
peace of sort and, under the name of National Front, arrived at a power-sharing 
agreement according to which the presidency would be swapped between the parties 
every four years, and  within each four-year term  cabinet and other high-ranking 
political posts would be divided up as well.  During those years, political murder fell, 
even as guerrilla activity continued and intensified.  After 1978, the power sharing 
arrangement broke down. Intense struggles and political dominance reemerged, now 
intensified by cocaine riches.  The latter brought drug cartels into the political struggle as 
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well, as drug-lords sought control over land to grow coca leaves.  This, in turn, appears to 
have drawn owners of large-scale land-holdings into the conflict and various para-
military groups emerged to participate in the struggle.910 
 
A model explaining cyclical terrorist murder then should contain variables for the La 
Violencia (a time period characterized by intense clashes between traditional political 
parties) and National Front years (the time period where the peasant self-defense 
movements or communist guerrilla appears). This is done in the simplest and most 
effective way with the use of dummy variables. Following Brauer & Gómez-Sorzano 
(2004B), I code La Violencia equal to 1 for 1947 to 1960, and call the variable B (for 
Bogotazo, which refers to the violent, murderous rioting in Bogotá and the whole country 
on April 9 1948). The National Front years (CL  conservative/liberal) are coded equal 
to 1 to 1958 to 1978. 
 
Effective variables  armed forces 
Whereas I do have numbers on the strength of the police and armed (i.e., military) forces, 
I am not in possession of large series for para-military, guerrillas, and drug-gangs.11 It 
might be argued, however, that the police and military personnel numbers reflect 
                                                        
9 . On the role and links between and among police, army, and para-military troops in the Colombian 
conflict see, e.g., Giraldo (1996). 
 
10 . The information in this paragraph is uncontroversial. For a history of Colombia see, e.g., Bushnell 
(1993). 
 
11 . Following reports in The Wall Street Journal and The Economist, numbers for 2002 run about 
22,000 members for FARC and ELN, the two largest rebel groups, perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 para-military 
troops, and another 5,000 or so drug-related troops.  The Colombian armed forces weigh in about 150,000 
(including 50,000 salaried, professional troops) and the police force at 100,000. 
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information about the strength and intensity of the various opposing forces so that, from a 
modeling perspective, the police and military forces could stand as a proxy for all armed 
groups in the country. 
 
Figure 2
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Figure 2 does show a constant level of armed forces during the National Front years, 
1958 to 1978 and an ascending one for police forces. Thereafter, I note a drastic force 
increase, lasting, especially from 1983 to 1990.  This was the time when cocaine became 
so profitable as to spur competition for control over land and corresponding political 
influence.  This mingling of old and new economic interests and political control, in 
which established political parties, the police and military, the drug-lords, and 
landowners and paramilitary participated, lasted, roughly, from 1978 to 1989 with a 
minor stop in the pace of violence from 1990 to 1991, when respectively the M-19 
guerrilla movement agreed to a cease-fire in order to create the political party Democratic 
Alliance M-19 and when Colombia adopted a new Constitution.  The post-1991 period 
was politically calm but shows a growing level of security forces because of the 
continued conflict among the drug cartels and later on during president Pastranas 
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government (1998-2002), between the paramilitaries and drug traffickers12.  Bushnell 
(1993) is explicit in referring to the post-1991 era as the end of war period (and we will 
return to this point). 
Although after examining figure 2, it does appear as if police and armed forces strength 
respond to different underlying motivations.  In particular, note that during the National 
Front years, the armed force variables remains relatively stable, picking up in 1979 
(7.6%) a year later after the National Front consensus broke apart, and increases 
drastically during the 1980s. The police force variable moves quite differently, 
decreasing in 1979 (-4.8%)13.  Since both variables respond to different motives, a priori, 
the movement of the total security personnel (police + army = Taf1) is more closely 
associated with the historical cyclical terrorist homicide observed in Colombia during 
19502004 because it also responds to different motives (political, economical and social 
motives) and it is this variable therefore what I will use in my model.  It also has the 
advantage of reaching back to 1950, giving me additional degrees of freedom.  In fact, 
the sharp rise in this variable in the early fifties is entirely consistent with the initial La 
Violencia years, increasing under the military General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). A 
different way to characterize the post-1978 period might be with the further use of 
dummy variables such as all-out-war (1979-1991) and end-of-war (post-1991) but 
                                                        
12. E.g., In 1993 Pablo Escobar escapes from prison launching a terrorist campaign as a the debate over 
extradition is pressed in Colombia by the U.S; also a new group, Los Pepes, (victims of Pablo Escobar), 
emerges, connected to the Cali Cartel, Los Pepes carried out acts of terrorism against Escobars 
organization and collaborated with the security forces in the search of Escobar up to his death by December 
this year.   (NACLA, Report on the Americas Vol 35, No.1 pp 24-27) 
 
13. The different movement of both series would be suggesting that in times of political clashes police 
forces increase while armed forces diminish; in similar way in times of guerrilla  drug traffickers and 
paramilitaries activities the armed forces increase while the police forces diminishes. 
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the use of a continuous, relevant variable such as Taf1 that stretches across almost the 
entire time-period (1950-2004) is statistically preferred.   
 
 
Economic variables 
 
The Colombian literature has noted a seemingly curious link between commodity-export booms 
and political violence, i.e., between economic well-being and increases in murder. Recent 
evidence finds for the seven biggest cities and their MSAs a strong relation between criminality 
and narco-traffic income (Sánchez, F and J. Núñez, 2000). One hypothesis is that commodity 
booms increase the pot-of-gold over which it is worth fighting14.  One might therefore speculate 
and test the hypothesis that, for Colombia, movements in the inflation-adjusted trade balance 
(Rtb6) is an explanatory variable for cyclically motivated terrorist murder.  An inspection of the 
descriptive graph (in figure 3) is suggestive. There are four four time-periods of pronounced 
improvements in the balance of trade: 1955-1959; 1971-1975; 1982-1991; and 1994-2001  
figure3.  Levels of cyclical violence in all of them are strongly directly associated with trade 
balance improvements and for this reason I am including this variable in my final model.   
 
Figure 3
-5000
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
19
46
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Real trade balance (left scale)
Cyclical terrorist murder per 100,000 people (right scale)
 
                                                        
14. We know from the African experience that natural-resource riches may exert powerful effects to 
attract contestants (see Sambanis, 2002, for a literature review on this and other aspects of the economics of 
civil wars). 
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Social variables 
 
As Jimeno (2001) cites there is a growing line of thought in Colombia that views violence as a 
non-specific, all-pervasive, non-historical phenomenon  the very essence of evil in Colombian 
society.  This tendency runs parallel to the reasoning of those who view violence as an endemic 
disease of the Colombian social structure, the product of its social inequalities. General Alvaro 
Valencia Tovar (1997) considers violence as a continuous chain of violences, possibly having 
remote origin in the acts of the Spaniard conquest, during those times inequality was essentially 
the product of clashes between the Spaniards invaders and the native rebellious Comuneros 
captains.  I therefore include in this model a historical social inequality variable using as a proxy 
for it education measured by the number of students matriculated in all modalities in Colombia 
(pre-elementary, elementary and high school)15.  My expected coefficient between enrollment and 
cyclical terrorist murder is negative. 
 
Figure 4
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15 . The National Demography and Health Care Survey (Profamilia, 1995) examined domestic violence 
in relation to the level of schooling and the number of children, both for spouse and child abuse, and found 
that the lower the level of education and the greater the number of children in the family, the greater the 
likelihood of domestic violence. (See Violence and Social Life in Colombia in Critique of Anthropology 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (2001) pp. 221-246) 
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Figure 4 presents the historical movement of selected indicators for education in 
Colombia:  students enrolled in all modalities and education expenses by the Ministry of 
Education. 
 
 
Forced Displaced people and the unemployment rate. 
 
The problem of internal displaced people in Colombia is one of the greatest facing the 
country today16. Nowadays, there are more than a million people affected by it and, this 
number is increasing daily as a consequence of the internal war.  In general terms these 
people lose everything, abandoning their homes and possessions, keeping themselves in 
permanent danger because of retaliation or the possibility that a new surge of cyclical 
terrorist murder force them to move again. The Law 387 of 1997 defines displaced 
people as, any person that has been forced to migrate inside the national territory, 
abandoning its quality shelter and its permanent economic activities because, his life, 
physical integrity, security and personal freedom have been wounded, or because they are 
directly threatened as a consequence of the internal war, disturbances and internal 
tensions, massive violations of the human rights and transgressions to the international 
humanitarian law. 
The Colombian Police has identified a total of five main causes generating displaced 
people:  clashes between illegal armed groups disputing the possession of the territory in 
certain areas of the country. Normally these confrontations occur in strategic drug 
producing areas of the country or close to the international frontiers between Colombia 
and the neighboring countries since these borders favor the international drug trafficking; 
second, selective homicides accompanied by threatens and pressure forcing people to 
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leave, splitting their families; third, massacres in which the delinquents deliberately killed 
peasants accusing them of being informants to guerrillas groups, to self defense groups or 
to the army; fourth, fumigations to coca crops affecting also basic plantations for human 
consumption and, fifth, the breaking of peace talks between the government or the 
guerrillas and paramilitary organizations (figure 5 shows the two statistical sources of 
data for displaced people: The Colombian National Police (1985-2001) and The National 
Planning Department, DNP (1985-2004).  Both sources are reliable from 1985 forth.  
However for running the model across the entire sample a reconstruction for these data is 
necessary and was done in the following way: from 1984 to 1962 the data for the 
National police was backcasted using its average growth rate of 24.2% between 1985 and 
2001 and creating a new data series called despla while the data for DNP was backcasted 
using its average growth rate of 19.8% between 1985 and 2004 creating the data series 
Despla2. The backcasting method turned both series in ceros from 1962 to 1946).17 18  
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 . Revista Criminalidad, Policía Nacional de Colombia, 2002. 
17 The two sources are nearly identical. At the time of writing this analysis I was in possession of data for 
The DNP up to 2004 but for the National Police just up to 2002. The data for The DNP shows a strong 
deceleration in displaced people by 212,000 and 117,000 respectively for 2003 and 2004 a fact that causes 
a jump in the forecasted component of terrorist murder for 2004 creating a new cycle in terrorist murder.   
18  One reader suggested that an alternative reconstruction for displaced people should be done using the 
narrative by Colombian historians, I present these calculations now: A) Reconstructing displaced people 
Source the Colombian National Police  despla3 (original) or despla5(expressed in thousands) (1985-
2001). The reliable data for displaced people for the National Police starts in 1985 going up to year 2001. I 
reconstructed the missing data from 1946 to 1986 using the narrative by historians. Bergquist, 1992, p.105 
mentions that in Tolima for example from 1949 to 1957 (a period of 9 years), 361,800 persons emigrated 
and, that these figure were greater in the state of Valle del Cauca. Using these data for Tolima results in an 
average of 40,200 persons per year, and I also use 40,200 per year for Valle del Cauca in spite of 
Bergquists warning that these figures could have been bigger for the latter one.  Accordingly I filled out 
the data for displacement from 1949 to 1957, with 80,400 per year, and also realized a correction to the 
data in the following way: I calculated the standard deviation (110 displaced people) for the annual data 
reported by the National Police from 1985 to 2001 and used this standard deviation, adding it year by year 
to the constant value of 80,400 from 1949 to 1957. According to this, the first data, for 1949 starts in 
80,400 and the last one for 1957 turns out to be 81,200.  Now for filling out the holes from 1946 to 1948 
and from 1958 to 1984, I first calculated year by year for the historical data 1985-2001 the proportion 
between displaced people and the number of homicides, and using these independent proportions, I found 
an annual average of 0.60% among them. This annual average was used for estimating the number of 
displaced people for the sub-periods 1946-1948 and 1958-1984.  The first data for 1946 is 7 displaced 
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Figure 5 shows both series, the backcasted, Despla2 (DNP) and the reconstructed 
(Despla3) for the National Police following the account of historical facts according to 
Colombian historians.  
Figure 5
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In regard to the consequences of displaced people, the Colombian Police also mentions, 
family splitting; political, social and cultural ruptures of the population, migration and 
most importantly the increase in the unemployment rate. It is for this reason that I have 
included the number of displaced people along with the unemployment rate in the four 
main cities of the country as predictors for cyclical terrorist violence. The logic is that 
displaced people coming to the four main cities is the result of innovations in cyclical 
terrorist murder in the countryside (so I expect a positive correlation between cyclical 
terrorist murder and forced displaced people); these new migrants to the cities in turn 
boost the unemployment rate19 reducing the social pressure and killing in the countryside 
(so I expect to find a negative relation between unemployment rate and cyclical terrorist 
murder in the countryside). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
people (obtained as 1,184 homicides times 0.006), for 1947 10 (1,715 homicides times 0.006); and for 1984 
is 64 displaced people (10,694 homicides times 0.006). 
 
19 The unemployment rate for 2003 is assumed to be 23.2% + 2.1%= 25.4%.  The 2.1% is the total growth 
in informal employment (April to June) from 2002 to 2003.  
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Figure 5A
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Figure 5A shows the direct relationship particularly in the 1990s between displaced families for 
innovations in cyclical terrorist murder in the countryside and its output or consequence, the 
increase in the unemployment rate 20.  For these reasons both variables are selected for inclusion.  
 
 
Results and interpretation 
 
My initial model to be tested thus is (with expected signs preceding the variables): 
 
(
),,
,3,,,1,3,,1]4[
ttt
tttttttt
RdeRgasoRcpr
DesplaStudentsUTafRtbCLBFCvpc
−−−
−−−++−+=
 
Where 
Cvpc1  estimated cyclical terrorist murder per capita 
B  years of La Violencia (1947-1960, following Bushnells dating) 
CL  years of National Front (1958-1978) 
 CL1  years of National Front (1958-1978) and (1994 to 2006)21 
Rtb6  real trade balance  
Taf1  total number of armed forces (police + army), also Taf11 
U  Unemployment rate (four main cities)  
Students number of students matriculated in all modalities, also students1 
Despla2 number of displaced persons (source DNP) 
                                                        
20 . The theoretical reasons for this relationship are explained in Revista Criminalidad, Policía Nacional 
de Colombia #45, 2002 pp 86-91.  It contains a description of the phenomenon of displaced people, 
generalities, legal background, causes generating displaced people, consequences of having these people 
displaced, and forms of displacement. 
 
21 As a curious remark Colombia has had alternation in power again from 1994 to 2006 (From 1994 to 1998 
Liberal Samper was in power, from 1998 to 2002, Conservative Pastrana, and from 2002 to 2006, 
independent liberal Uribe) 
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Despla3 number of displaced persons  reconstructed series according to 
Bergquist (source Nat.Police). 
  
The monetary variable real trade balance is measured in millions of pesos. Since the data 
for the total armed forces is available only as from 1950, the model is run for 1950-2003.   
Table 1: estimation results  using despla2 
Dependent Variable CVPC1A - Estimation by Least Squares 
Annual Data From 1950:01 To 2003:01 
Usable Observations     54      Degrees of Freedom    47 
Centered R**2     0.833494      R Bar **2   0.812238 
Uncentered R**2   0.855403      T x R**2      46.192 
Mean of Dependent Variable      2.8798697883 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 7.4678033423 
Standard Error of Estimate      3.2359155837 
Sum of Squared Residuals        492.14403426 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.800841 
Q(13-0)                             9.194643 
Significance Level of Q           0.75808920 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
B 9.485082 1.12 8.44 0.00
CL1 -3.226489 1.02 -3.15 0.00
RTB6 0.001503 0.00 4.09 0.00
TAF11 0.000195 0.00 7.26 0.00
U -1.002479 0.16 -6.34 0.00
STUDENTS1 -0.000002 0.00 -3.39 0.00
DESPLA2 -0.033890 0.01 -5.16 0.00
 
 
Table 2: estimation results  using despla3 
Dependent Variable CVPC1A - Estimation by Least Squares 
Annual Data From 1950:01 To 2003:01 
Usable Observations     54      Degrees of Freedom    47 
Centered R**2     0.831370      R Bar **2   0.809842 
Uncentered R**2   0.853559      T x R**2      46.092 
Mean of Dependent Variable      2.8798697883 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 7.4678033423 
Standard Error of Estimate      3.2564895423 
Sum of Squared Residuals        498.42203455 
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.784386 
Q(13-0)                             7.918340 
Significance Level of Q           0.84887924 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
B 10.699296 1.09 9.78 0.00
CL1 -3.142554 1.03 -3.05 0.00
RTB6 0.001395 0.00 3.75 0.00
TAF11 0.000176 0.00 6.89 0.00
U -0.916351 0.16 -5.68 0.00
STUDENTS1 -0.000002 0.00 -2.81 0.01
DESPLA3 -0.037792 0.01 -5.07 0.00
 
All coefficient estimates conform to my prior expectations.  The La violencia dummy is 
positive and statistically significant; the National Front dummy is negative and 
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statistically significant, proving the reason to regard the inherited partisan rivalry of 
Liberals and Conservatives as one of the most important causes of cyclical terrorist 
murder. As to the monetary variables, the trade balance effect is positive, as predicted, 
and is also statistically significant. The total number of armed forces variable is 
statistically significant and carries as, expected, a positive sign. The unemployment 
variable shows the expected negative sign indicating the trade-off between the 
deceleration in cyclical terrorist murder in the countryside and the increase in 
unemployment in the four main cities. The number of students matriculated carries the 
expected sign being statistically significant; in regard to displacement of people in table 1 
I used Despla2 and in table 2 Despla3, its coefficients carry the expected negative sign 
indicating that people coming to the cities diminish pressure in the countryside reducing 
terrorist murder.  Both models display a good adjusted R^2 of 0.83 and optimal Durbin-
Watson indexes of 1.80 and 1.78.  
 
Preparing the model for forecasting purposes:  Forecasting the explanatory 
variables using ARIMA models (the Box-Jenkins approach) 
 
 
For forecasting the future path of cyclical terrorist violence in Colombia I estimate in this 
section the political, economic and social explanatory variables feeding up the model for 
cyclical terrorist murder.  All variables are forecasted excepting the years of La Violencia 
and the National Front, for which I fill out the spreadsheet containing these dummies 
with ceros and ones for National Front to account for the recent historical alternation in 
power. The methodology used is the BoxJenkins approach.  
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Forecasting the Colombian real trade balance and total armed forces. Figure 6 
shows the forecasts up to year 2019.  The real trade balance is forecasted using ARIMA 
model (1,1,18) no constant term included but moving average components of order 
2,13,7,18. Armed forces use ARIMA (2,1,2) with constant term, and autoregressive and 
moving average components of order 1 and 2.  
 
Real trade balance and Armed forces forecasts 2006-
2019, Figure 6
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Forecasting the unemployment rate in the four main cities and students matriculated(figure 
7). The unemployment rate uses ARIMA(0,1,9)(1,0,0), no constant term included but moving 
average components of order 1,7,9;  students matriculated is fitted with ARIMA (2,1,3), with 
constant term included and autoregressive components of order 1,2 and moving average 
components of order 1,3. 
 
Gómez-Sorzano: A Model of Cyclical Terrorist Murder in Colombia 1950-2004.  Forecasts 2005- 2019       
                                                                                                                                                                
 
24
Unemployment rate and Students matriculated 
forecasts 2005-2019, Figure 7
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Forecasting the number of displaced people- despla2 and cyclical terrorist murder (figure 8).  
Displacement of people (despla2) is forecasted with ARIMA (0,1,16) with constant term.  The 
scenario presented here for didactical purposes is an extreme situation where 9 million of 
displaced people around year 2019 will reduce terrorist murder in the countryside by 231 
terrorist murders per 100,000 people.   
Displaced people and cyclical terrorist murder per 
100,000 people forecasts 2006-2019, figure 8
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Forecasting the number of displaced people- despla3  and cyclical terrorist murder (figure 
9). Displacement of people (despla3) is forecasted with ARIMA (1,1,18) with constant term and 
moving average components of order 1,4,5,16,18.  The scenario presented here for didactical 
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purposes is implying 137,000 displaced people around year 2019 placing terrorist murder at a rate 
of 70 terrorist murders per 100,000 people.   
 
Displaced people and cyclical terrorist murder per 
capita forecasts 2006-2019, figure 9 
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Conclusion 
 
Provided with a data series of cyclical terrorist murder in Colombia 1946-2004, I created 
a model to explain the movements in that terrorist murder data.   I confirm that obvious 
variables, such as coding for the La Violencia and the National Front years, are indeed 
statistically significant (and of the expected sign).  I also find that, as the narrative 
literature and Brauer & Gómez-Sorzano (2004B) suggest, an increase in the real trade 
balance leads to higher levels of cyclical terrorist murder; and, that an increase in armed 
forces or armed actors increase the cyclical terrorist murder; finally as the Colombian 
National Police and several historians suggest I also find statistically that the increase in 
displaced people (families coming to main cities of the country) decreases the cyclical 
terrorist murder through the reduction of pressure in the countryside and causes in turn a 
increase in the unemployment rate in the main cities of the country.  In regard to the trade 
balance the underlying theoretical point is that trade balance improvements derive from 
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commodity booms (coffee, banana, cocaine, gold, coal, emeralds, petroleum, gas) that 
make land more valuable and therefore the competition for it more severe, historically 
this phenomenon has occurred from 1945 to 1955 via a coffee boom and most recently 
1985-1990 via the war for cocaine and petroleum among the government, drug traffickers 
and guerrillas.  Finally, I find that increases in the number of students enrolled in all 
modalities (pre-elementary, elementary, high school, university) reduce the cyclical 
terrorist murder. 
In regard to the recent overall results in the behavior of murder and cyclical terrorist 
murder per capita for Colombia, figures 1 and 1A show the results between the past and 
current administrations.  During President Pastranas government (1998-2002), both 
graphs show an upwards tendency in both indicators, while for 2003-2004 they present a 
sharp decrease, implying that Alvaro Uribes Democratic Security Policy is highly 
effective at annihilating terrorist guerrilla clashes in the countryside and strongly 
suggesting that a continuation of this policy would be destroying the roots of the 
Colombian civil conflict. 22  However, the analyses presented in this paper show the big 
dilemma currently facing Colombian authorities: the forecasts shown in figures 8 and 9 
show the trade-off or inverse relationship between displaced people and cyclical terrorist 
murder. The forecasts presented when varying the number of future displaced people 
                                                        
22.  These findings coincide with the analyses done by Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat (2004) in regards 
to Uribes first 17 months in the presidency, quoting them in their abstract to the paper The Colombian 
Conflict: Uribes first 17 Months:  Analysis of our new, 16-year dataset on the Colombian civil war finds 
under Uribe: guerrilla and paramilitary attacks dropping sharply to long-run averages since 1988, lower for 
April-December 2003; government-guerrilla clashes at all-time highs, exceeding guerrilla attacks; civilian 
killings dropping sharply and continuously to all-time lows, mainly from decreased paramilitary attacks; 
combatants killings rising sharply to all-time highs; guerrilla tactics shifting toward indiscriminate 
attacking, forcing civilians injuries to long-run highs; government-to-guerrilla casualty ratios in clashes 
falling; government-paramilitary clashes increasing but still uncommon; paramilitary performance in 
clashes poor and worsening; guerrilla-paramilitary clashes dropping sharply; the ELN (National Liberation 
Army) seriously weakened, mounting few attacks. 
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using two different sources show a dramatic picture in which the reduction of forced 
displacement (despla2- figure 8) from 212,000 people in 2003 to 117,000 in 2004 is 
having a impact on the intensity of the conflict, creating a new cycle boosting the terrorist 
murder concentrated in the countryside from -6.93 murders per capita in 2003 to 12 in 
2004 and 14 in 2005. Although this upsurge in murder appears to be erasing the initial 
results obtained in 2003 by The Uribes administration, terrorist murder is expected to 
decrease again by 2006 and 2007 (figure 8) and peace will be attained around year 2008 
(-38 terrorist murders, figure8)23.   As to sustainable peace, figures 8 and 9 show two 
scenarios on which the natural tendency of the predictors captured by the ARIMA 
modeling must be stopped in order to prevent having extreme opposite figures of 231 or 
70 murders according to both graphs respectively by year 2019; and so an equilibrium 
around cero for terrorist murder must be found through active leadership and presidential 
policy manipulation. Previously designed scenarios not presented has shown that the only 
way to get such a permanent lasting peace at this point, is through general disarmament 
of all armed actors, starting by guerrilla, paramilitary groups followed by the Army 
which was oversized and modernized by the Democratic Security Policy. The remaining 
required conditions will include a combination of political variables and the returning of 
a modern alternation in power followed by investment in education increasing 
enrollment in conflict and non-conflict areas; these pre-conditions will restore the 
economy reducing the unemployment rate since displacement disappears once 
disarmament is achieved, the trade balance will restore equilibrium by itself once the war 
                                                        
23 This figure is expected as a result of the natural up trending Box Jenkins forecasts assumed by the 
predictors feeding up the model. 
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in the countryside is over.  The scenarios for Permanent Peace show that the continuation 
of the Democratic Security Policy will grant sustainable peace before year 2019. 
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Appendix: data sources 
 
All monetary variables were obtained in nominal terms and converted with the implicit GDP 
deflactor (1994=100).  The deflactor is obtained for 1946-49 from CEPAL, for 1950-1980 from 
Banco de la República (Central Bank of Colombia), and for 1981-1999 from Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). 
 Per capita adjustments are made on the basis of total population (millions) counts coming 
from the censuses of 1953, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1993 and projections by DANE. 
 Nominal social expenses (in millions of Colombian pesos) consist of health expenditures 
and education expenditures.  For 1946-1970, taken from Estado y Hacienda Pública en 
Colombia, 1934-1990, by César Giraldo (Contraloría General de la República); for 1971-1999, 
taken from financial reports of the General Comptrollers Office of Colombia. 
 Nominal trade balance data (millions of colombian pesos) is obtained as the difference of 
exports and imports of goods and services; Banco de la República (Colombian Central Bank), 
DANE, and calculations by the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Planning 
Department), Macroeconomics Studies Unit. Nominal private consumption (millions of 
Colombian pesos); Banco de la República, DANE, and calculations by the National Planning 
Department, Macroeconomic Studies Unit.  Nominal government consumption (millions of 
Colombian pesos); Banco de la República, DANE, and calculations by the National Planning 
Department, Macroeconomic Studies Unit. 
 The data for the total number of personnel of the Colombian police (PF) and for the total 
number of members of the armed forces both come up to year 1989 from the National Planning 
Department, Justice and Security Unit; from 1999 and projections to 2006 come from the 
National Ministry of Defense. 
 The coding for the years of La Violencia and the National Front years are taken from 
Bushnell, 1993. 
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 Total homicides are the sum of four murder series: murder (homicidio), aggravated 
murder (homicidio agravado), murder with cyclical intent (homicidio con fin cyclicala), and 
death associated with the exercise of official duties (homicidio con función, razón cargo o 
ejercicio de sus funciones).  The data are taken from various issues of Revista Criminalidad; 
Colombian National Police. Finally, the cyclical component of total homicides is computed by 
and reported in Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, and Sethuraman (2004). 
 The unemployment rate for the period 1950-54 comes from the monthly bulletins of 
statistics (DANE), for the period 1955-1976 it was taken from Londoño (1990) and, since 1977 it 
corresponds to the unemployment rate in the four largest Colombian cities (Bogotá, Cali, 
Medellín and Barranquilla) the source is DANE. 
 The number of students enrolled in all modalities (pre-elementary, elementary, high 
school, university) are taken from 1946-1990 from Londoño (1990), for 1987-2002 from the 
Ministry of National Education and the ICFES (Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher 
Education). 
 The data for displaced families are taken from Revista Criminalidad #45, 2002 p.p.  86-
92; and Justice and Security Unit National Planning Department (DNP).  
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